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Ghost in the Shell 2, Technicity and the Subject 
 
Daniel Hourigan1 
 
This article examines how Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence (Inosensu, 
Mamoru Oshii, 2004; hereafter Innocence) questions what remains of being 
human and the assemblage of humanity when the human and the machine 
collide and elide their limit of differentiation.2 The former, being human, is 
a question of what philosophy terms ontology: the way or structure of 
existence or being. Innocence treats the question of reorganising the 
ontology of humanity (its place in existence) in noticeably technological and 
esoteric registers. Therefore it will be necessary to dwell on the particular 
moments in the film when human ontology is confronted: are we to expect a 
smooth unfolding of an artificial post-humanity where everything becomes 
a technological fabrication, malleable and easily substituted, or is there an 
invitation to rupture both the ontological notion of human being and the 
conceptualisation of technology in the elision of their difference as the 
definition of humanity is encoded in a technological framework? These 
questions are linked to the way that Innocence constructs and assembles 
humanity in the film by renaming subjectivity as a ‘ghost’. Herein it will be 
shown how the film’s predilection for technology in its narrative content 
and technological rationalism in its wider conceptual embedding 
reconstructs humanity but rejects the metaphysical valuation of humanity 
through notions of dignity, taboo, respect, affect, and so forth. This rejection 
results in the ghost having the structure of what psychoanalysis calls a 
‘symptom’: a ciphered message/signifier that appears in a discourse but is 
not addressed to anyone in particular. By connecting this twin problematic 
of ontological difference and metaphysical poverty to the ontological 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the psychoanalytic philosophy of 
Slavoj Žižek, this article aims to unearth and lay bare the paradoxes inherent 
in the view of technology and society deployed by Innocence and how the 
film is able to, in the presence of these explicitly ontological paradoxes, put 
the question of what constitutes a human Subject into crisis by coding it as a 
symptom.3 
                                                
1 Griffith University: d.hourigan@griffith.edu.au 
2 Release titles for the film have varied and also include Inosensu: Kôkaku kidôtai and 
Innocence: Ghost in the Shell. This discussion relies on the Australian special-edition DVD 
release, which is entitled Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence 
[http://www.madman.com.au/catalogue/view/6347/ghost-in-the-shell-2-innocence-2-disc-
special-edition]. 
3 Subject is captialised here to emphasise its philosophical status, the Subject devoted to a 
Cause rather than the signification of a (human) person. For further clarification, please see 
‘Technicity and the Symptom’ below. 
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Ghosts, Subjectivity, and Paradoxes 
Mamoru Oshii’s technophilic obscuritanist opus Innocence is a film that 
highlights the virtues and vicissitudes of contemporary humanism in the 
encounters between the human Subject and technology. The narrative of 
Innocence speculates that, in the immediate future of 2032, the line between 
the human and the machine will have been erased and human civilisation is 
thoroughly saturated with and supplemented by technology. Dolls, known in 
other science fiction terminology as androids, function as robotic 
companions, and a particular line of Locus Solus gynoids (female robots 
designed for the purpose of sex) are malfunctioning and killing their 
owners. Two agents, Batô and Togusa, from the top-secret government 
agency known as Section 9 are called in to investigate the homicides as a 
potential terrorist threat. What Batô and Togusa uncover, however, is terror 
rather than terrorism: the humanness of the Locus Solus dolls, their je ne 
sais quoi, is the illegal imprinting of the psyches of adolescent girls against 
their will. This imprinting gives the dolls a ‘ghost’ that is a type of soul for 
the technological age in which the film is set.4 The empty rattling of the 
dolls’ ghosts, while the cause of their murderous malfunctioning, is also a 
plea for aid by the girls who are being imprinted onto the dolls against their 
will. This imprinting serves to underscore the elision of any traditional 
demarcation of difference between the human and the machine: the 
excessive essence of humanity that conferred its uniqueness is now itself 
part of technology (see Žižek 2006, 102). 
The question this discussion pursues, through the vantage of 
philosophy and psychoanalysis, is what rejoinder does Innocence offer to 
this erasure, if any? The script of Innocence knits together a patchwork of 
references to the metaphysics of Descartes, the fallen state of man from 
Milton’s Paradise Lost, the cyborg-affects of Donna Haraway, and more, to 
render this erasure visible. Yet the links between these meditations remain 
obscure throughout the film, consistently being trumped by a mystical 
relation with the technological spectacle. Innocence thus often presents 
kernels of wisdom only to fold into a sublime technological spectacle: 
Descartes is discussed in a surreal lab scene (a scene to which I will return 
at length); biblical psalms are quoted while flying over the shimmering neo-
Gothic communications towers of a northern frontier; Milton is pondered 
while landing outside the chateau of a hacker named Kim; and so on it goes 
for the duration of the film. The task of this discussion is therefore to 
intervene in this sublime foreclosure on contemplation and to dwell on what 
make technology tick in Innocence. The question underlying this discussion 
is thus: is Innocence a film about ontology of the human Subject, or the 
                                                
4 For a useful analysis of how these aesthetics and inherent theology are established in the 
preceding film, Ghost in the Shell, see Napier (2005, 103 – 116). 
Film-Philosophy 17.1 (2013) 
Film-Philosophy ISSN 1466-4615 53 
metaphysics of technicity that determines the conception of humanity? 
As previously stated, the plot of Innocence revolves around the 
investigation into a series of geisha-esque dolls, endowed with the imprint 
of subjectivity (the opaque kernel of subjectivisation that the film calls a 
‘ghost’) that have begun to murder their owners, by the mostly human 
counter-terrorist operative Togusa with his cyborg partner Batô. Like 
Togusa’s partner Batô, many other characters in Innocence are 
cybernetically enhanced to the point where removing such enhancements 
would result in the inability of the body to sustain itself.  Rather than 
rehearse the tired opposition between the human and the machine, the 
narrative of Oshii’s film underscores how humanity actively seeks to create 
itself anew in technological prostheses, substitutions, and supplementations: 
a motif being revisited from the first Ghost in the Shell film (Kôkaku 
kidôtai, Oshii, 1995) (Napier 2005, 106 – 108). A surreal maze-like 
encounter between Togusa, Batô, and Kim late in the film explicitly details 
the way that the film’s narrative as a whole makes it hard to justify the idea 
that one can be ‘more human’ simply because the body has not been 
materially substituted by technical devices; rather, technology embodies the 
essence of humanity and humanity’s effort to fashion itself by ‘making dolls 
in its own image’ and herein technology repeats humanity’s discomforts as 
much as it enables greater power and pleasure.  
But in this fabula mundi of self-wrought humanity Innocence does 
not entirely dispense with the idealist conception of subjectivity wherein an 
immaterial air or psyche animates the body. To draw a bare and minimal 
difference between humans and machines, Oshii’s script carries forward the 
trope of a ‘ghost’ from the first film, which can loosely be defined as the 
intuitive subjective essence that grants a being human subjectivity. Hence 
the narrative of Innocence invites the idealist concept of a ‘ghost’ to bear the 
burden of subjectivity so that we, the viewers, are not merely watching 
machines involved in automatic motion but observe these highly modified 
humans as Subjects with an intuitive interiority, a type of metaphorical 
depth of character (Napier 2005, 107). As Batô says to Togusa of the cyborg 
lab technician Haraway: ‘I bet she writes her own opinions in the margins of 
her reports though; I used to do that.’  
In a lab scene where Togusa and Batô discuss the subjectivity of 
machines with a technician named after the cyber-feminist Donna Haraway 
there is an especially instructive interaction for discerning whether 
Innocence is a film about the further unfolding of human ontology or the 
reconstruction of the metaphysical categories that give humanity 
metaphorical cache (Osmond 2005, 63 – 64). Taking place early in the film, 
this scene throws an ethological swerve into the narrative: the technician 
Haraway asks Togusa and Batô whether a child is as fully ‘human’ as an 
adult, suggesting that the chaos that precedes adulthood called ‘childhood’ 
is able to be deconstructed as an arbitrary designation rather than an innate 
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difference between children and adults that somehow defines the essence of 
their humanity.  Using the example of a little girl playing with dolls to 
demonstrate this deconstruction, Haraway comically interrogates the 
detectives about the meaning and humanistic context of the play of the girl:  
 
Children have always been excluded from the customary 
standards of human behaviour. Only if you define humans 
as those who possess a conventional identity and act out of 
free will. And what are children who live in the chaos 
preceding maturing as humans. They clearly differ from 
humans but they definitely have human form. Little girls 
use dolls to play house and pretend that the dolls are their 
babies. The dolls are not surrogates in place of real babies; 
the girls are not practising child rearing at all. It may just 
be that playing with the doll happens to be similar to 
raising children. 
 
The problem here is that hypothetical little girl in the example might as 
easily be playing with the doll, be that with or without the wish to have a 
child of her own, as much as an android designed to perform the same game 
might also imitate nursing an infant with a doll. What Haraway offers the 
detectives here is a criticism of a logical fallacy based on the construction of 
some necessary raison d’être of humanity from the empirical evidence of 
the child’s play, which is only held in the immediate fantasised coordinates 
of the example. 
While this aporia is made plain in the film by Haraway’s 
interrogation of the Togusa and Batô, there is a further complication if we 
examine the temporality of the doll example. The doll with which the girl 
plays presents itself in the immediacy of technician Haraway’s example as 
something that exists as an independent object that metaphorically stands in 
for another meaning: that is, caring for children. However, the link between 
the doll and the girl at play is far more tenuous: is the doll a supplement for 
a projection into a future that is yet to exist (the girl becoming sexually 
mature and then bearing and raising a child)? If the doll were instead a 
substitute rather than a supplement for the hypothetical infant-to-be then this 
would mean that the substituted doll precedes the (ontological) presence of 
both the child and the doll in the example by its association with a future 
state of the child. Thus the emphasis on the future state of the girl-child as a 
mother-figure over-determines the object made in the image of humanity: 
the doll. In effect, the technology of the doll is humanised by its 
appropriation into a discussion of the child’s future vis-à-vis her present, but 
the discussion of the child becomes technical and rationalistic in its flawed 
elaboration of the existence of the doll as less than what it is (‘less’ in the 
sense that the future is not yet, while presence is a totality). 
The problem with the way that Innocence elaborates the existence 
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and the future of the girl-child is that it substitutes the presence of the child 
with the ambiguity of a future that may or may not come to pass and 
displaces this presence to render it incomplete. Such a substitution removes 
emphasis from the play of the child in its immediacy, in its ontological 
there-ness, and condenses this ambiguity in the supplementation of the 
doll’s existence by adding this ambiguity to the doll as a metaphor that 
ultimately suggests that the girl-child may not just be leisurely enjoying 
herself.  We can rephrase the problem with this example in more concise 
terms as: it is predestined that all which appears to be has already been (will 
come to pass), and simultaneously that all which is cannot be what it 
appears to be. This aporia appears in Innocence as the diegetic erasure of 
the limit between the human and the machine: the doll and the child lose 
their uniqueness by the substitution of the doll’s presence and the 
concomitant betrayal of the child’s presence through the over-determination 
of its future: that is, she will or will not have children. Herein the example 
of the child and doll offered by Haraway to Togusa and Batô offers an 
ontological function of the child’s play by blurring the category of the 
child’s ontological position (as a unique singularity that has a manifold 
plurality of relations to other beings) with the category of her ontic activity 
as a Subject.  The technician Haraway is effectively suggesting that the doll 
is simultaneously on the side of the child (as a human Subject) and on the 
side of being, and uses the dynamic of supplementation to put a question 
mark over the status of the little girl’s activity as it is condensed in the 
technical object of the doll.  
Furthermore, what the technician Haraway offers us in the place of 
the diegetic erasure of the human and the machine is an illegitimate 
argument for the presence of the doll through the technical reduction of the 
child. Put simply: the supplementation cannot be consistently given as a 
procedure of the presence (material existence) of all beings including the 
doll because to do so is to admit that the doll in-exists. Herein the doll is not 
what it appears to be because it is present and therefore has no claim to this 
presence outside of its association with the child, and yet this is the crux of 
the argument upon which Haraway relies in order to differentiate the doll in 
the hands of the little girl from the infant in the arms of a parent. As this 
scene plays out in Innocence the human detective Togusa ‘breaks down’, 
and we can perhaps understand his anxiety given that this paradox of 
presence manifests precisely where the human (child) and the machine (doll, 
as technical object) meet and their differentiation is elided: all technology 
becomes an extension of the human.  
 
Being, Fabricated 
Although the lab scene example ostensibly begins with the question of 
whether or not a child is as ‘fully human’ as an adult, the example itself 
circulates around the meeting of the human and the machine through their 
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general indistinction by way of the former’s substitution of the latter. This 
generalisation of the human and the machine as ‘stuff’ is a recurring motif 
of Innocence—from cyborgs to technologically enhanced vision—that 
strikes a chord with the thinking of technology as technicity elaborated by 
Martin Heidegger. The Heideggerian conception of technicity is especially 
useful for understanding the substitution and supplementation at work in 
Innocence because Heidegger’s discussion directly addresses the same 
thematics of substitution, supplementation, and generalisation with which 
we have been engaged thus far and reveals the structure of the grounding 
philosophical assumptions about technology deployed by Oshii in 
Innocence. 
Heidegger’s conception of technicity addresses the importance of the 
common perception of technology that Innocence melds with the human. 
This common perception can be summarised as: the understanding and 
rationalisation of the Subject as a force that drives or gives purpose to a tool 
that then carries out a given task. We can observe this summary explanation 
at work in the early parts of the film when Batô taunts a Yakuza boss, ‘Hey, 
Wakabyashi, do you really think two grenades are enough take out an 
armoured cyborg,’ and the previous example offered by Haraway in the lab 
scene; it is through the child’s play with the doll that the doll performs its 
function as a supplement (which I have criticised above).  As Heidegger 
eloquently suggests, this supplemental relation is important to analyse 
because: 
 
One points out with enthusiasm that the machine is 
powerless without the power of man and then concludes, 
equally enthusiastically, that the overcoming of technicity 
by man is thus already and fundamentally accomplished. 
However, on the one hand, the machine is not the same as 
technicity. And, on the other hand, there arises the 
question: what is this power of man that utilizes the 
machine? This power is nothing other than the 
empowering of engineering to the fundamental form of 
organizing beings. And this empowering is grounded in the 
includedness of man into being insofar as being is 
determined as machination. (Heidegger 2006, 155) 
 
In this quotation from his second major socio-historical treatise, 
Mindfulness (2006), Heidegger is sensing the problem of technological 
structure, or ‘technicity’, as it ensnares the Subject: it is only in terms 
common to the discourse of technicity that the Subject can emerge; 
however, these terms are already part of the self-referential chain of 
representation allowing us to recognise ourselves as subjects in the first 
place (Heidegger 2006, 151 – 155). In the encoding of technology as an 
extension—perhaps even the res extensa—of the human, Innocence 
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effectively renders technology as the discourse of the Subject. 
The figure of Batô stands out in the film as a being ‘determined by 
machination’ (Heidegger 2006, 155). His repertoire of technological 
enhancements and quirks—his bottle-cap eyes in particular—define him as 
a machine in part, but the stream of esoteric references to ancient literature 
such as the Old Testament and his ostensibly human form seem also to 
include him under the aegis of humanity. What neither of these brief 
definitions attends to, however, is the way that Oshii’s film—akin to 
Heidegger’s discussions of beings (Kisiel 2005, 14)—does not seek to 
delineate the human from the machine. Instead, Innocence draws a character 
like Batô through an understanding of being prior to its description as this 
emotion or that servo motor, this child or that circuit, etc. Batô and, to a 
large extent, most of the other characters in the film understand their own 
existence in a frame that is technologically engineered, in which most parts 
of their bodies are government property and their lives are not ‘an issue’ for 
the recovery of this property. This technologically engineered organisation 
of beings empowers Batô’s humanity but at the price of this humanity never 
being able to exist independently of the technological supplementation and 
substitution that enables him to be the Subject that he understands himself to 
be. This echoes Heidegger’s argument that humanity’s encounter with 
technological supplementation is not a matter of being so much as a 
supplementation disguised as anthropomorphism wherein subjectivity 
becomes ‘human subjectivity’ that resists transformation beyond the sway 
of technology (2006, 137 – 141). The terms of Batô’s subjectivity are thus 
conditioned by what Heidegger calls ‘technicity’; even the very terms of his 
self-expression are wrought of a discourse of producibility and machination 
(Heidegger 2006, 151 – 155). 
Heidegger’s elaboration of technicity makes this matter all the more 
pressing when we consider his definition of ‘machination’, as ‘the 
accordance of everything with producibility, indeed in such a way that the 
unceasing, unconditioned reckoning of everything is pre-directed’ (2006, 
12). Heidegger’s outlining of machination here directs our attention to the 
way that machination ‘adjoins beings as such to the space of a play that 
continually plays into machination as an ongoing annihilation’ and the way 
that machination constantly annihilates in ‘the very threat of annihilation’ 
(2006, 12). This threat of annihilation grounds the producibility/fabrication 
of machinations, and Innocence repeatedly displays this threat of dissolution 
as an abyss: the rationale for the production of technologies and technical 
objects in the film is never addressed, although it is questioned by both 
Haraway and Kim at different times wherein both lines of questioning 
ultimately refer back to the discourse of technicity (producibility, 
annihilation, machination) as a way to overcome organic evolution. The 
film is thus consonant with Heidegger’s insistence that the representations 
erected by the discourse of technicity collapses into the metaphysics of 
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technicity of these structures: metaphysics in the precise sense that 
technicity is a transvaluation of existence through its ability to annihilate 
and fabricate/produce (Heidegger 2006, 151). Thus we have the situation 
that technicity can offer itself up as a world-view that obfuscates the 
ontological grounding of a Subject such as Batô in existence by reducing 
this Subject to merely an object of discourse that cannot defy description 
and therein annihilation. 
Heidegger decries this delicate dynamic of technicity for hiding 
being, for disenfranchising the Subject’s questioning of technology by 
claiming that the Subject only questions out of ignorance of the ‘essence’ of 
technology: its producibility (2006, 154 – 155). Questions of the a priori 
justifications of technology do not feature in the metaphysical hierarchy of 
value sustained by Innocence’s technophilic obscurantist cosmology 
precisely because any ‘thing’ must be able to be annihilated/produced. For 
all of the film’s high-minded referencing of Descartes and Milton, the over-
determination of technicity renders what appears as the ‘erasure’ of the 
distinction between the human and the machine to be a reification of the 
technological as a metaphysics. 
 
Technicity and the Symptom 
Innocence exhibits a powerful portrayal of technicity but it also presents a 
series of disruptions, of points where technology goes awry across a 
spectrum of rationales from intentional intervention (called ‘hacking’) to 
disrepair and misuse. Heidegger’s emphasis on the threat of annihilation 
may seem too broad a stroke to deal with this malfunctioning of technicity, 
but in the context of Heidegger’s project this is a matter of organising and 
understanding existence. However, in the context of Innocence, the threat of 
annihilation appears to incite a more complex response than the zero-sum 
enframement of beings by technicity: symptom.  
The contemporary reception of Heidegger’s critique of technicity 
takes many forms, but the one of particular interest for its understanding of 
the symptom is that of psychoanalytic philosophy, particularly that of Slavoj 
Žižek. Žižek’s limited engagement with technology is largely complicit with 
the Heideggerian critique of technicity, although it hardly sustains this 
critique for long before moving back to Žižek’s more familiar Lacanian 
territory.5 This return to Lacan reveals Žižek’s reliance on the Lacanian 
point that ‘the symbolic world is the world of the machine’ (Lacan 1988, 
47). We may therefore read Žižek’s discussions of the Symbolic with an eye 
to the way these are also discussions of technology, despite the absence of 
                                                
5 See, for example, the discussion of cyberspace in The Plague of Fantasies (1997, 127 – 
167); or this discussion’s improved version in Žižek’s contribution to Janet Bergstrom’s 
Endless Night (1999a, 96 – 125); the reading of becoming against Deleuze in Organs 
Without Bodies (2004, 15 – 19; 118 – 123); or even his essay on traversing the fantasy in 
cyberspace in The Žižek Reader (1999, 102 – 124). 
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an overtly phrased critique of technicity (Žižek 2006, 195). And herein we 
might open up a different road to the ontology and metaphysics of 
Innocence: the royal road to the unconscious. 
The Lacanian understanding of the Symbolic makes the nuances of 
technicity in the diegesis of Oshii’s film apparent: the annihilation and 
producibility of technicity are endowed with the fantasmatic privilege of 
being necessary archetypes over the valuation/metaphysics of the world 
(Lacan 1988, 48). This can be observed in several ways: firstly, the way in 
which everything inhabits the annihilation-producibility binary of 
technicity, from Batô to his cloned pet Basset Hound; secondly, how 
fabricated objects are revealed as meaningless due to mechanised 
production’s need for the annihilation of the non-technological aspects of an 
object, which subsequently renders the world of Innocence as intensely 
technical/technological; and, lastly, how technicity ordains the 
‘subjectivisation’ of the Subject’s self-experience, by representing her/his 
inner-states as signifiers in the chain of technicity’s signification, with the 
promise of having ourselves understood by other agents/objects/signifiers in 
the discourse of technicity: as Batô—commenting on the government’s 
desire to recover the body of his beloved Major—says, ‘the brass [...] don’t 
give a damn about her life, it’s not an issue for them.’  The latter point also 
suggests that in the world of Innocence any power a Subject suspects they 
have over technology—following the afore mentioned common perception 
of technology—is a metaphysical misnomer for the fantasy supplement 
offered by technicity, wherein the Subject is promised a fabrication that will 
deliver them from their illusory subjective mind (res cogitans): as in the 
dream of ‘uploading’ consciousness that is made concrete in the film with 
‘electronic brains’ and the mysterious Major Kusanagi’s existence 
‘somewhere on the vast net.’6  While these examples may appear as a 
somewhat scattered collection, what they serve to underline is how 
Innocence consistently offers its audience a concrete conceptualisation of 
technology in the discourse of technical objects and cybernetically-
enhanced characters that constitute the film’s diegesis. This technicity of the 
film structures a supplement for its characters that hinges on their reflective 
inclusion into the discourse of technicity (a point to be expanded upon 
below): a supplement that promises but does not necessarily deliver a 
release from all too human limitations (see Žižek 1989, 131 – 132). 
This promise of deliverance is a feature of technological structures 
worth puzzling over because it promises to validate the Subject as a notional 
‘Subject’ and simultaneously constitute her/him in the metaphysics of 
technicity (see Žižek 1989, 105 – 108).7  These two positions can be 
                                                
6 It is interesting to note that, while she has a name in the first film (Major Kusanagi), the 
second film reduces her to only a title: the Major. 
7 The ‘Subject’ is herein capitalised to emphasise its transcendent status as the point from 
which we observe ourselves. 
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understood as: the Subject is how we appear to ourselves to be likeable, 
embodying the Ideals of the hierarchy of values in which plural relations are 
embedded; and our constitution is what we would like to be, the (future) 
projection of what we lack (see Žižek 1989, 105). Returning to the example 
of the child playing with the doll offered by Haraway in Innocence, this 
promise of deliverance presents a different approach to the ‘neutral’ 
technical terms in which the example is phrased. If a paradox does indeed 
inhere in the example through a category error, then we can postulate that 
this promise of deliverance sustains this paradox through the inclusion into 
technicity, reread as the annihilation and fabrication of the child as a Subject 
domesticated within the demands of technicity. 
This fantasmatic promise of technicity is promulgated through its 
metaphysics and herein conditions the manifestation of the Subject as s/he is 
integrated into the discourse with ‘the dotting of the I’ by the promise of 
metaphysical validation. Here metaphysics appears to be restricted to 
designating the background of rules giving a discourse its conditions of 
signification; which is to say, annihilation and producibility condition the 
signification of technicity as a discourse (see Heidegger 2006, 152 – 153). 
In this limited capacity metaphysics gives a form to the integration of the 
Subject into a discourse that is particular to that discourse: the technological 
Subject-machine, the psychoanalytic Subject-analysand, etc. Where the 
promise of technicity gestures to some future fulfilment for the Subject, this 
promise functions as a metaphysical treasure, thus sustaining the Subject’s 
place in the conditions under which the discourse operates rather than 
simply being a mere signifier in the discourse alone (see Heidegger 2006, 
152). To follow Žižek’s paraphrasing of Lacan, the ‘Subject of the I’ is the 
point from which we observe ourselves (Žižek 1989, 105).  
It is not the case that the Subject is in some pre-Symbolic Beyond, 
but rather that the place of Innocence’s characters in the discourse of 
technicity only defines them in signifiers common to the signification of 
technology, and therein the Subject proper to their being cannot be fully 
articulated by the delimiting modalities of discourse.8 Again and again in 
the film, we see the disquiet with which the protagonists Batô and Togusa 
are burdened when they examine the limits of technicity; in an especially 
pointed moment at the end of the film, Batô angrily and rhetorically asks 
how much must be subjected to the annihilation-fabrication binary, all the 
while knowing what the answer is: Everything!  Batô’s visceral disquiet in 
this late scene on the Locus Solus factory vessel is aimed at the immoral 
imprinting of subjectivity onto robots by Locus Solus not only because of 
the fatality it inflicts on the adolescent girls whose ghosts are being copied, 
but equally because there are machines being created with the burden of 
                                                
8 Heidegger refers to this phenomenon as the ‘forgetfulness of being’ constitutive of the 
metaphysical conditions of the annihilation-producibility binary in technicity (2006, 191). 
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subjectivity. What drives Batô’s anger in this scene is the gap between 
discourse and ontology, between being a Subject whose inner-states are 
reflected back to them with names given by technicity and the basic ghost-
like feature of existence that persists in excess of the integration into 
technicity; the crafting of subjectivity, the techne of the ghost, is an all too 
human burden that is mapped onto the machines. For Batô this is a 
fundamental error of technicity: its symptom. And this symptom occurs 
precisely at the point where the techne of Batô’s ghost, the burden of his 
subjectivity, functions as a bar between his humanity and the non-human 
cybernetic enhancements without which he would perish. 
 
The Techne-Symptom 
With the technicity of Innocence thus elaborated and the symptom it 
constructs through Batô’s encounter with Locus Solus’s methods of 
fabrication, we are now in a better position to understand the radical 
differentiation of ontology and metaphysics that inheres in the film. In 
Innocence, techne has the status of a bar between the metaphysical ghost of 
subjectivity and the discourse of technicity (technological structure) wherein 
technicity produces the Subject: but for this discourse first to emerge it must 
arbitrate the instantiation of its own order or logic (see Žižek 1996, 76). In 
this grounding of the validity of the discourse, the discourse posits a 
‘ground’ from which extends the justification for its symbolic law. That is 
to say, the emergence of technicity accompanied by the technocratic ‘end of 
metaphysics’ heralded by Innocence’s nihilism must first violently penetrate 
the Subject’s self-conscious relation to herself or himself.  
In Innocence we see the mysterious Major as well as the cyborg 
Batô and the mostly-human detective Togusa engaged in acts of reverse-
engineering this cut or ‘scission’, giving language to themselves as Subjects, 
and facilitating the articulation of an ‘I’ in technicity.9 Presented with the 
choice between ontology and metaphysics, Innocence falls on the side of 
metaphysics every time because the collapse of the human into the machine 
is not a meeting of equal and ideal types but rather of the highwayman, 
money, and life. Without technicity the Subject cannot inhere in the abstract 
causality mystically invoked by the logic of detection carried out by Batô 
and Togusa: everything happens for a reason that robs subjectivity of its 
freedom, happens for a motivation that makes it valuable to a Subject, for a 
cause that lets the Subject be a Subject.  Technicity enables the latter cause 
under its terms of annihilation and fabrication, and the drama of Innocence 
follows this cause, even to the point where the protagonists become 
reflexively angered by the very plot that enables their characterisation: that 
is, those rare moments where they truly become Subjects. 
                                                
9 An important qualification to be made here is that the ‘symbolic totality’ promised by 
technicity is not ‘monadic’ but, rather, self-referential and repetitive. 
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Here it is crucial to avoid misinterpreting the instantiation of a discourse and 
its attendant metaphysics as an absolute beginning because this merely 
mystifies how a Subject like Batô can exceed his grounding in technicity 
and become angered by the polyvalency of technicity: that is, making 
machines more human not just humans more mechanised (see Žižek 1996, 
78). As a discourse, technicity must misinterpret what persists to refuse full 
symbolic integration, and, as this objecting element, techne is a cipher that 
stands for the emergence of autonomous self-consciousness parallel to the 
instantiation of the mechanics of discourse (see Heidegger 2006, 152). What 
this means is that the presentation of techne in Innocence exhibits itself as a 
self-conscious engagement with technicity. 
The ramification of this is that the techne of ghosts in the film does 
not arise from the mechanics of the discourse of technicity but ex nihilio—
from the void outside the discourse—insofar as a Batô-Subject who exceeds 
technicity and disrupts its normative order is party to technological 
structure, yet cannot begin from within the discourse of technicity in its 
totality. The techne of subjectivity in the film—the burden of a ghost—thus 
operates in the fashion of a symptom: the techne-symptom. This ‘techne-
symptom’ is a cipher through which technicity can promise full symbolic 
integration on the side of discourse but shift the failure of this integration 
onto the insufficiently technical nature of the void starting point of the 
Subject. This shifting of lack is the cause for Batô’s anger on the Locus 
Solus factory vessel when he recovers a terrified girl calling for help from 
one of the imprinting machines: technicity is making ghosts technical by 
copying them at the cost of the life of the being that bore that ghost. In a 
twist reminiscent of film noir and cyberpunk literature, the narrative of 
Oshii’s film plunges subjectivity into the black market economies where the 
clean sci-fi dream of uploading consciousness becomes mortifyingly 
decadent (see Napier 2005, 108 – 109). Subjectivity—the non-technical 
object par excellence—becomes a problem to be solved through its 
technification, not as a technology but instead as a fabrication that literally 
annihilates the being from whence it came (see Heidegger 2006, 154). Thus 
what Innocence adds to the discussion of technicity and the symptom is that 
it is all too simple to envisage technicity fabricating symptoms and 
embedding these in its discourse as Subjects, provided that the insufficiency 
of technicity to understand the techne-symptom of the ghost is made the 
insufficiency of the ghost and not of technicity. 
This shifting of lack occurs in Innocence through a blurring of the 
distinction between the ‘Subject of the I’ repeated in the discourse of 
technicity and the metaphysical externalisation of the inner self-conscious 
states of the Subject in the mechanics of this discourse (the point where we 
observe ourselves). And, moreover, this obfuscation hides the void-Subject 
indicated by the contingency of the arbitrary justification of technicity as a 
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discourse through its self-posited ground. In a particularly interesting 
conversation between Batô and Togusa just prior to their arrival at the lab 
where they discuss the malfunctioning dolls with Haraway, this distorted 
mirroring of the Subject is made plain: 
 
BATÔ: When one’s face is distorted, why should you blame the 
mirror? 
TOGUSA: The mirror does not help to enlighten but, rather, to 
confuse. Right? 
BATÔ: Well, neither one of us are good looking enough to stare into 
a mirror.  
 
Although Batô passes off this discussion with a jibe about their looks, the 
brief chat emphasises an elision concealing a paradox: the arbitrary 
justification that conceals the violent grounding of technicity (‘why should 
you blame the mirror?’)—the cut of discourse—reveals a void-Subject 
where the techne-symptom (‘one’s face’) threatens the fantasmatic 
compensatory promise of technicity with its dissolution (‘the mirror does 
not help to enlighten but, rather, to confuse’).  
This paradox of concealment and revelation situates the techne-
symptom between metaphysics and discourse as an impediment blocking 
any direct relationship between the metaphysical hierarchy of value that 
binds the mechanics of technicity and the self-justification of the discourse 
as such (see Heidegger 2006, 161). Throughout Innocence this is made plain 
as the impossibility for a singular technical rationale as to why the Locus 
Solus dolls are malfunctioning; even Haraway cites multiple factors that 
could contribute to the problem. Humanity as a ghost—as the techne-
symptom—bars technicity from its elucidation of this ghost as a technical 
object by externalising its inner-states.  The problem for explaining the 
malfunctioning dolls is that the discourse in which the film phrases its 
narrative is technicity rather than technological rationalism: the very 
mechanics of the discourse of technicity come to stand for the value of 
objects rather than the subjective encounter with them: cuing Batô’s anger 
when he uncovers the burdening of machines with ghosts/souls. Herein the 
mechanics of the discourse become mimetic significations of the 
metaphysics rather than the presence of metaphysics itself. The metaphysics 
of technicity is thus repressed and re-emerges as attributes of the discursive 
objects themselves; that is, annihilation and producibility become the prima 
causa of technical objects in their totality. There is no logic as to why the 
machines are attacking their human owners except that the machines are, at 
the very least, machines (see Heidegger 2006, 152). 
 
An Aporia  
The techne-symptom is an aporia of technicity that emerges as a point of 
failure in Innocence. The difficulty here begins with the objectification of 
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the Subject through the externalisation of her/his inner-states, which re-
presents the Subject in technicity and also points to this objectification as 
the motor driving representation (see Heidegger 2006, 153). 10  This is 
problematic for technicity because technicity is predicated on the 
objectivisation of materiality, positing the apparition of reality prior to the 
experience of its representation, or meta-physics: a view which is 
incommensurable with the self-legitimation of technicity’s own demarcation 
of what exists (to be annihilated and fabricated) (see Heidegger 2006, 153 – 
154). This encounter between material objectivity (that posits what ‘is’ as a 
kind of epistemic index, unquestionable in its truth-value) and the 
objectification of the Subject (in the fabricated signifiers that make up the 
discourse of technicity) produces the strange effect of foreclosing on the 
interpretation of individual characters such as Batô and Togusa because 
their manifestation as Subjects puts them at a double-remove from whatever 
might precede, in Heidegger’s terms, signification in technicity (2006, 155). 
In a type of endless refrain throughout the film, discussions of what exists 
within technicity is met with a mystical sense of awe: the Major is 
‘somewhere on the vast net’; Kim’s hacking of virtual experience is 
indistinguishable from lived experience at a purely phenomenological level, 
voiding questions of what exists and what does not; Haraway’s nihilistic 
deconstruction of the category of child reduces all distinctions to useless 
aporetic formality; and the Chief’s ‘let no one walk alone, living no sin, 
with very few wishes. Like elephants in the forest’ recurs, bobbing up to the 
surface and retroactively suggesting that he, like Batô and Togusa, might 
have also been hacked by Kim.  The paradox of technicity in Innocence is 
thus: the need to interpellate the characters as Subjects with interiority 
through the notion of a ghost/subjectivity—and therefore maintain the 
diegesis within conventional narrative limits—is contradicted by a 
conceptual framing of technology and human-machine fusion that serves to 
fabricate even this experience of a ghost (because all experience and 
memory is malleable in the mythos of electronic brains in the film), to 
deprive the subjectivity of the Subject of its unique ontological disclosure in 
the world of the film. This paradox produces different effects in the 
narrative, but the recurrent mysticism is the most obvious. 
A less obvious result of this paradox is that while Innocence may 
ostensibly seem to be dealing with metaphysical questions of subjectivity—
reality versus simulation, and signification—the deployment of technicity in 
the film betrays it as an inherently anti-metaphysical discourse. This anti-
metaphysical emphasis manifests because (as a discourse) technicity’s 
founding premise is self-legitimating and cannot repeal the investment in 
materiality of the ghost of subjectivity without destroying the discourse of 
                                                
10 ‘Objectification’ is herein the re-presentation of an object in the terms of an unchanging 
character: for example, the inscription of elements on the periodic table or the reduction of 
corporeal responses to ever-more basic units of interaction. 
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technicity in the process.11 This naïve materialist inhibition therefore refuses 
the legitimacy of objectification (of rendering any character, Batô, Togusa, 
etc., a Subject as such) because it leads to the re-presentation of the limits of 
materiality and therein reveals the a priori position of the Subject to be 
beyond the realm of technicity. Indeed this problem is precisely how Batô, 
after the Major helps him to escape Kim’s maze of virtual experience, 
responds to Kim’s question—‘Batô, are you certain that this is not an 
extension of false illusions generated by virtual signals’—late in the film: 
‘my ghost is whispering to me, if that’s what you mean.’  
Even more strongly, however, this inhibiting of objectification 
drives the supplementation of the Subject’s position in technicity (a name) 
together with the material-yet-contingent symptom of the Subject’s 
existence wherein the fantasy space of all hypothetical imaginings become 
apparitions of reality, ordering fantasy into the category of hallucination: 
Kim’s question cited above, for example. We are thus confronted with the 
question of the Subject’s immateriality: if the techne-symptom of the 
Subject’s being is contingent, then where is the Subject if there is no 
nervous tic of being; if all goes smoothly in technicity, in what domain is 
the Subject if not being? This question shows that the materiality of 
technicity in Innocence is strung over the abyss of nothingness and that this 
is what grounds the presupposition of the apparition of materiality by 
technicity in the film (and perhaps in Heidegger’s conception also, although 
such a reading would be against the grain of his later emphasis on the 
Ereignis) (see Malpas 2006, 214).12  
Moreover, it also means that the manifestation of the Subject as an 
object—its objectivisation—can assure its registration by technicity 
provided that the objectification involved remains inhibited and void. If the 
Subject is held to be a contingency—a symptom of their techne in lieu of 
having a ghost—then this also introduces an inner-outer boundary to the 
abyss that voids the Subject when they are in the abyss; the Chief’s 
statement ‘one need not be Caesar to understand Caesar’ becomes incarnate 
as ‘one need not be Caesar to be Caesar’s ghost’. This is precisely the sort 
of phrenological supplementation of subjectivity with which the film 
struggles in the figure of the Locus Solus doll.  Here, the manifestation of 
the techne-symptom in Innocence is part of the idealist topos of material 
reality, wherein any claim to the techne of a ghost rests in the void that 
remains unprescribed by technicity’s metaphysics and yet prescribes the 
being of the Subject articulated by the discourse of technicity. This means 
that the dolls malfunction because of the burden of having a ghost, of 
becoming Subjects. 
                                                
11 See the ‘Techne-Symptom’ section above. 
12 A point which deserves further discussion but is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
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Conclusion 
 
The dynamic interplay of the human and technicity in Innocence offers a 
wide ambit of philosophical themes. But what this interplay most 
importantly shows us is a Subject in crisis: burdened by the weight of their 
ghost, of machines with subjectivity. Innocence does not offer any diegetic 
resolution to this crisis, but with the aid of Heidegger and Žižek it was 
possible to discern some of the problems surrounding the narrative’s subtle 
elision of the divide between the human and the machine, which initially 
appeared to substitute technology as an extension of humanity but was 
revealed under the analysis of technicity in the film to be a supplementation 
of the Subject whose humanity had become a malleable technical object to 
be annihilated and fabricated. This Subject was shown to be predicated on 
the techne-symptom: the burden of subjectivity. And the imprinting of 
ghosts onto the Locus Solus dolls was identified as the precise narrative 
kernel that revealed the transgressive portent of technicity. Innocence is not 
simply a film about technology, yet it does reveal a troubling vision of 
technology in a conceptual mode—technicity—that puts the Subject out-of-
joint but hides the paradoxes that support this crisis of the Subject. 
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